R&D and knowledge dynamics in university-industry relationships in biotech and pharmaceuticals : an agent-based model by Triulzi, Giorgio et al.
 FZID Discussion Papers
Universität hohenheim | Forschungszentrum Innovation und Dienstleistung 
www.fzid.uni-hohenheim.de
CC Innovation and Knowledge
Discussion Paper 33-2011
R&D anD KnowleDge DynamICs
In UnIveRsIty-InDUstRy RelatIonshIPs 
In BIoteCh anD PhaRmaCeUtICals:
an agent-BaseD moDel
giorgio triulzi, Ramon scholz
& andreas Pyka
Universität hohenheim | Forschungszentrum Innovation und Dienstleistung
www.fzid.uni-hohenheim.de
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 33-2011 
 
 
 
 R&D and Knowledge Dynamics in University-Industry 
Relationships in Biotech and Pharmaceuticals: an Agent-Based 
Model 
 
Giorgio Triulzi, Ramon Scholz, Andreas Pyka 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Download this Discussion Paper from our homepage: 
 
https://fzid.uni-hohenheim.de/71978.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1867-934X (Printausgabe)  
ISSN 1868-0720 (Internetausgabe) 
 
 
 
 
 
Die FZID Discussion Papers dienen der schnellen Verbreitung von 
Forschungsarbeiten des FZID. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung  
der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des FZID dar. 
 
 
FZID Discussion Papers are intended to make results of FZID research available to the public  
in order to encourage scientific discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely  
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the FZID. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
R&D and Knowledge Dynamics in University-Industry 
Relationships in Biotech and Pharmaceuticals: an 
Agent-Based Model1 
  
 
Giorgio Triulzi 
UNU-MERIT and School of Business and Economics, 
Maastricht University, The Netherlands 
triulzi@merit.unu.edu 
 Ramon Scholz 
University of Hohenheim, Germany 
ramon.scholz@uni-hohenheim.de  
Andreas Pyka 
 University of Hohenheim, Germany 
a.pyka@uni-hohenheim.de  
 
Abstract 
In the last two decades, University-Industry Relationships have played an outstanding role in 
shaping innovation activities in Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals. Despite the growing 
importance and the considerable scope of these relationships, there still is an intensive and open 
debate on their short and long term effects on the research system in life sciences. So far, the 
extensive literature on this topic has not been able to provide a widely accepted answer. This work 
introduces a new way to analyse University-Industry Relationships (UIRs) which makes use of an 
agent-based simulation model. With the help of simulation experiments and the comparison of 
different scenario results, new insights on the effects of these relationships on the innovativeness of 
the research system can be gained. In particular, focusing on knowledge interactions among 
heterogeneous actors, we show that: (i) universities tend to shift from a basic to an applied research 
orientation as a consequence of relationships with industry, (ii) universities’ innovative capabilities 
benefit from industry financial resources but not so much from cognitive resources of the 
companies, (iii) biotech companies’ innovative capabilities largely benefit from the knowledge 
interaction with universities and (iv) adequate policies in terms of public basic research funding can 
contrast the negative effects of UIRs on university research orientation.   
 
Keywords: University-Industry Relationships, Knowledge Dynamics, University Patenting, 
Technology Transfer, Agent-Based Modelling. 
                                                      
1 The authors would like to thank participants to the sixth European Meeting on Applied Evolutionary 
Economics in Jena (May 2009) and Herbert Dawid for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
First versions of the paper have also been presented at the VI Triple Helix Conference in Glasgow (June 
2009) and at the EAEPE 2009 in Amsterdam (October 2009). 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last thirty-five years science-based industries have been strongly influenced by a radical 
scientific breakthrough, the engineering of the recombinant DNA technique made by Stanley 
Norman Cohen and Herbert Boyle in 1973 (Cohen et al., 1973), and by a major institutional 
change, namely, the surge in university patenting (see Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Saragossi and van 
Pottelsberg, 2003; Balconi et al., 2003; Breschi et al., 2007; Lissoni et al., 2007). Consequently, the 
way innovation is pursued in the bio-molecular industries has been crucially affected. On the one 
hand, the advent of the biotechnology paradigm has forced pharmaceutical incumbents to deal with 
a radically different set of capabilities than organic chemistry, upon which pharmaceutical firms’ 
core-knowledge was grounded. This has pushed large diversified pharmaceutical firms (LDFs) to 
adopt an innovation strategy characterized by a twofold interaction with the generators of the new 
scientific knowledge, namely dedicated biotech firms (DBFs) and universities. On the other hand, 
the spreading of university patenting has further increased the importance of universities as a 
source of new knowledge and basic research findings, not to mention the role of universities as 
biotechnological start-up incubators. The joint effects of these two breakthroughs led to a dramatic 
strengthening of university-industry relationships (UIRs). Indeed, both biotech and pharmaceutical 
industry widely rely on universities, as well as on public research institutions, to acquire mainly 
fundamental but in part also applied external knowledge. The raise and the crucial importance of 
UIRs in the innovation system of life sciences led to a growing awareness of economic and medical 
literature on this central topic. Nevertheless, the costs/benefits debate concerning short and long 
run effects of UIRs on the innovativeness of the research system in the pharmaceuticals and 
biotech, is still open and intense.  
Therefore it is of primary importance to understand whether UIRs are a phenomenon which 
intrinsically presents short-term benefits and long-term drawbacks or whether there are different 
and additional effects to be considered. In the former case, UIRs should not be furthered at all, 
because short-run and self-reinforcing effects would induce universities to rely more and more on 
these relationships as source of funding, even though this would generate harmful effects on the 
long run innovativeness of the research system as a whole. In the latter case, the two effects are 
opposed and in dependence on their relative strength the total effect on the innovativeness of the 
research system as a whole can be positive. 
The lack of a generally accepted evaluation of UIRs, despite their meanwhile long tradition, can be 
traced back to a twofold shortcoming. First, the complexity of these relationships makes it difficult 
to analyse their multiple correlated effects. In particular because of this complexity it is more and 
more important to consider the role of all the actors which are engaged in the biotech and 
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pharmaceuticals’ innovation systems and to analyse how these relationships affect each of them (i.e. 
universities, industry and governments). To focus only on a selected group (e.g. universities or 
firms) can be misleading. For instance, in the life science sectors networking with universities is 
crucial for firms in order to ensure knowledge exchange and innovation.  A fully systemic analysis 
of UIRs has to consider the two way character of these relations. Furthermore, for the analysis of 
UIRs in the biotech and pharmaceutical sectors, it has to be considered that they are embedded into 
a broader innovation system where also the government plays an important role (e.g. Niosi, 2010). 
In particular there is a growing debate in the literature and in media on the nature and role of public 
funding with respect to academic research. Several studies highlight complementarities between 
public and private R&D while others claim a substitutive relationship between these two sources of 
research funding (for a comprehensive literature review, see David et al., 2000). 
The second shortcoming stems from the limitations of traditional scientific tools which have been 
used for this analysis so far. Qualitative (interviews, case study, etc.) as well as quantitative (surveys, 
econometric models, etc.) and theoretical analysis have been extensively applied to study the UIRs 
phenomenon. Without doubt, they have been extremely useful to understand some specific aspects 
of UIRs and to gain useful insights into the complex relations, but they all missed a key issue, 
namely the interaction sphere dealing in particular with knowledge flows between different actors.  
In the attempt to overcome these shortcomings, we apply a different methodology to investigate 
this phenomenon: agent-based models (ABMs) (see Triulzi and Pyka, 2011). Due to their focus on 
multi-agents’ micro-interactions, ABMs are explicitly suited to analyse UIRs and generate new 
insights to the UIRs debate. Furthermore, this class of models can be meaningfully applied to study 
phenomena where data cannot be easily collected – in our case knowledge dynamics - and allows 
studying self-reinforcing mechanisms. Therefore, by building an agent-based UIRs model, we aim 
to provide a new dimension for the discussion on UIRs long run effects on the production of 
innovative new drugs based on the interaction of the different agents and on the underlying 
knowledge dynamics. For this purpose we draw on an extensive and growing literature about 
simulation models of innovation networks (Gilbert et al., 2001 and 2007; Pyka et al., 2002, 2007 and 
2009; Ahrweiler et al., 2004a and 2004b and 2009; Pyka and Scholz, 2009) which guided us in our 
research and is laying the foundations of our model.  
The paper is organized as follows: The theoretical framework and the hypotheses to be tested are 
introduced in section 2.  Then a description of the methodology (section 3) and of the agent-based 
UIRs model follows (section 4). Finally, the results generated by simulation experiments are 
introduced (section 5) and discussed (section 6). 
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2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
The biotech and pharmaceuticals’ system of innovation is grounded on complex interactions 
among many different actors. Several studies analyzed UIRs focussing only on the effects that these 
relationships have on single classes of actors, generating very useful insights but loosing the 
overview on the systemic nature of these relationships. Nevertheless, these detailed and specific 
insights and concerns are undoubtedly helpful to set a general model of the biotech and 
pharmaceuticals’ system of innovation centred on UIRs. In the following we will very briefly review 
the most important issues which constitute the theoretical framework of our model. From these 
arguments some hypotheses are extracted. We grouped them by actors: universities, industry and 
government.  
 
2.1 UIRs’ effects on universities  
 
In life sciences the generation of new scientific discoveries and the achievement of highly 
innovative and patentable research results strongly depend on a sound understanding of a particular 
disease. In order to have chances to find an innovative and effective drug for a certain disease the 
crucial point is to deeply study the disease. Only this way one can understand how the human body 
is affected and how to “attack” the causes and the effects of the disease. That is, in general terms, 
what basic research deals with (Angell, 2004). Therefore, the generation of innovative medical 
solutions can be attained more easily by those actors which are characterized by a fundamental 
research orientation, i.e. universities2.  
Following the main arguments of the costs/benefit debate in the literature, UIRs may move 
universities away from their traditional basic research orientation, in favour of a more-applied one, 
because of distorted traditional academia incentives and reward schemes. However, UIRs are 
potentially able to create a virtuous circle, labelled as the ‘resource effect’ which, through the 
increase of financial and cognitive resources available for an university, could boost its productivity 
with respect to innovative research results.  
On the cost side, many authors (e.g. Angell, 2004; Ding, 2004; Geuna, 2001; Blumenthal et al., 
1996) suggest that UIRs can potentially damage the long run innovativeness of the research system 
in life sciences. Following this literature, UIRs have modified the reward system for academic 
researchers and for universities in general, introducing a personal and institutional incentive to do 
more applied research. From this point of view, the possibilities to increase industry funding 
stemming from the commercialization of academic research potentially push universities away from 
                                                      
2 This is what we assume in our model, coherently with the empirical evidences showed by Angell (2004). 
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the pure basic research in favour of a more applied research, in order to increase the probability to 
end up with patentable research outcomes. The results might be harmful for the system because it 
might generate a situation in which less scientists and less academic institutions are engaged in pure 
basic research, which is a fundamental component of the whole system necessary to generate 
scientific discoveries which open new research areas. 
In particular the most common forms of UIRs are (i) large diversified firms (LDFs) sponsorships 
to universities, (ii) university patents licensing and (iii) joint research projects between universities 
and dedicated biotech firms (DBFs) (Blumenthal, 2003). Industry-sponsored research is often 
focused along the goals of the sponsor rather than on the goals of the researcher or the sponsored 
academic institution (AUTM Licensing Survey, 2007). Therefore, projects of this nature tend to 
involve applied research instead of fundamental research, as argued by Poyago-Theotoky et al. 
(2002). The considerable financial resources which come along with licensing also strengthen the 
incentive to focus on applied research. Universities may be induced to put stronger emphasis on 
those research projects which offer a higher probability to achieve patentable outputs. Finally, the 
same shift of the research direction may be caused by an increase of joint research projects with 
DBFs, due to the influence of knowledge exchange with actors whose research interests are more 
commercially-oriented (especially in case of frequent and long interactions). Therefore we postulate:  
H1: University relationships with industry, in terms of sponsored research, university 
licensing and joint research projects, cause a shift from basic to applied research in 
the research direction of universities.  
On the other hand, according to the U.S. National Science Board, the reason why UIRs increased 
tremendously are the potential positive effects of these relationships on the availability of university 
research funding, on the speed of technology transfer and on economic development in general 
(NSF, 1996). Indeed, many studies (e.g. Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998; D’Este et al., 2005), 
showed that access to additional financial resources and to industry skills and facilities, as well as 
the search of research applicability are among others the reasons why university researchers interact 
with industry. Some authors (Breschi et al., 2007; Markiewicz and Di Minin, 2004 and Azoulay et 
al., 2004) postulate the existence of a resource effect: interactions with industry, providing larger 
cognitive and financial resources, increase the productivity of academic scholars and university 
institutions in terms of publishing and patenting, thus increasing their visibility, fame and 
reputation. By this, a self-reinforcing virtuous circle is generated which ultimately boosts research 
productivity. In particular, sponsorships, licensing and joint research projects, provide a unique 
balance of financial support, expertise and knowledge exchange which creates a prolific atmosphere 
for applied research that may result in an increase of patentable outputs by the university compared 
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to basic programs supported by government or by universities themselves. Following this 
reasoning, we formulate the second hypothesis:  
H2: The access to cognitive and financial resources coming from industry increases 
university productivity in terms of truly innovative outputs. 
 
2.2 UIRs’ effects on the industry 
 
In pharmaceuticals and biotech basic research plays a fundamental role. Of course, in order to 
produce commercially meaningful outputs, basic research needs to be matched with adequate 
applied research. Considering both, the narrowness of resources as well as the limited competences 
of actors, it is easy to understand that no actor is able to manage all the research process, from basic 
to applied research, and to keep pace with the innovation process and the rate of new knowledge 
production in isolation. Therefore, biotech and pharmaceutical firms, specialize in one area of 
research and in selected parts of the knowledge space, thus, relying on interaction with other actors 
in order to complete the research process (Arora and Gambardella, 1990 and 1994; Powell et al., 
1996; Pyka and Saviotti, 2005). In other words, a wide part of the innovation activities in the 
biotech and pharmaceutical sectors is undertaken in innovation networks, in which science-
technology interactions and bi-directional knowledge flows arise. A halt to relationships with 
universities would significantly affect the expansion of companies’ knowledge base, with a negative 
effect on firms’ productivity in terms of truly innovative patents and drugs. This holds in particular 
for DBFs because, due to their limited financial resources, they have to specialize in a narrower part 
of the knowledge space (Pyka and Saviotti, 2005) and hence can substantially benefit from 
interaction with universities. From this the third hypothesis follows:  
H3: Interaction with universities increases dedicated biotech firms’ productivity in 
terms of truly innovative outputs.  
 
2.3 The role of government and the impact of its research funding policies 
 
UIRs in biotech and pharmaceuticals have to be placed in the broader context of the Triple-Helix 
system of research (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997, 2000) 
which also includes government agencies. In several countries government plays a crucial role in the 
biotech and pharmaceuticals’ system of innovation, as main funders of academic research. Due to 
the growing importance of industry as additional source of funding for universities, the role of 
public R&D funding with respect to private R&D has been increasingly gained attention (see, 
David et al., 2000). Several econometric analyses (Jaffe, 1989; Adams, 1990; Acs et al., 1991; Toole, 
1999a and 1999b), as well as historical case studies (Link and Scott, 1998; National Research 
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Council, 1999) demonstrate that public R&D has positive spillover and stimulating effects on 
private R&D and beneficial effects on the generation and diffusion of new technologies. In 
particular, in the case of UIRs, an increase in public research funding for basic research can reduce 
the pressure on universities to search for external funding from industry, thereby reducing the 
potential negative effects of these relationships. If universities can rely on large and stable funding 
sources which also guarantee academic freedom, they can use partnerships with industry to foster 
the exchange of knowledge and to diffuse university-generated technologies. This allows 
universities to select partnerships more carefully, avoiding those which provide considerable 
resources but also potentially harm academic freedom. A brief overview on the historical evolution 
of UIRs in U.S. seems to sustain this hypothesis. Considering the past record, as shown by 
Blumenthal (2003), we observe that a cut in U.S. government investments in basic research, like in 
mid-1970s, led American universities to increasingly search for industry partnerships. Vice-versa, 
when public funding was widely available, like after World War II, relationships with industry were 
considered to be less crucial. Therefore, we believe that government funding policies more 
favorable to basic research allows for mitigating the potential negative effects on university research 
orientation caused by interactions with industry. If this hypothesis is proved to be correct, our 
findings also sustain the idea of complementarities between public and industry research funding. 
The hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H4: An increase in government basic research funding prevents the shift of university 
research direction from basic to applied research.     
 
3. Methodology 
 
To investigate the long-run effects of UIRs on innovative capabilities and to analyse the knowledge 
dynamics among the involved actors an agent-based model has been developed. The model is 
characterized by the interactions among different actors which lead to modifications of the agents’ 
knowledge base. The model allows tracing the knowledge dynamics for each class of actors as well 
as their patenting behaviour.  
The methodology used is particularly suitable to provide new insights to the costs/benefits debate 
on UIRs. In fact, as Dawid and Fagiolo (2008) pointed out, the fundamental characteristic of agent-
based computational models is their ability to explicitly capture “the relationship between structured 
interaction of heterogeneous individuals and the emerging patterns at the macroeconomic level, and to incorporate 
different types of boundedly rational individual behaviour”.  Furthermore, ABMs allow testing hypotheses 
that could not be analyzed with traditional tools. For instance, knowledge dynamics can hardly be 
studied with conventional quantitative analysis because data are not easily available. Finally, another 
important advantage of this class of models is the possibility to make experiments, for example 
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eliminating some classes of actors from the population, which are able to provide insights that 
could not be generate by the solely observation of reality.  
Our hypotheses are tested with simulation experiments which make use of a standard and some 
alternative scenarios. Results are then compared and tested for statistical significance. In order to 
reduce the random component of the results and to increase their trustworthiness, we ran sets of 20 
Monte Carlo simulations for 100 periods and then compute the average value for each of the 
variable under observation. The comparison of the results of different simulation experiments 
proves a fair level of stability of the model with respect to those parameters that were not modified 
exogenously. 
 
4. The model 
 
The model is a multi-agent simulation which reproduces R&D and knowledge dynamics in the 
biotech and pharmaceutical sectors, with a particular focus on the role of UIRs3. We draw on a 
theoretical model of innovation networks originally developed by Gilbert, Pyka and Ahrweiler 
(2001 - see also Pyka et al., 2002). This model is further refined in subsequent works in which it has 
been applied to study knowledge dynamics between innovation network’s agents (Ahrweiler et al., 
2004), to investigate the impact of different learning activities on agent’s knowledge stocks (Gilbert 
et al., 2007), to highlight the persistency of cooperation activities in knowledge intensive industries 
(Pyka et al., 2007) and to investigate the existence and channels of knowledge spillovers among 
agents (Pyka et al., 2009). Further works have applied a modified version of the model to study the 
governance of EU-funded innovation networks (Pyka and Scholz, 2009) and to explore the role of 
science-technology links for innovation diffusion (Ahrweiler et al., 2011). We extend the original 
theoretical model to reproduce the innovation system of biotech and pharmaceutical industries, 
explicitly taking into account different classes of agents moved by diverse aims and rewards 
(universities, biotech and pharmaceutical firms), multiple channels of interactions (research 
collaborations, licensing and sponsored research) and different research outputs (three classes of 
patents and drugs). 
 
4.1 The agents 
 
The model’s population is composed of universities (UNIs), large diversified firms (LDFs) and 
dedicated biotech firms (DBFs). There are two further actors, a National Research Agency (NRA) 
and venture capitalists (VCs). However, these latter agents are funding bodies (of universities and 
biotech firms respectively) which are not actively engaged in research. Agents’ research efforts 
                                                      
3 The NetLogo code of the model is available upon request to the first author. 
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follow different aims. However, a common feature of firms and universities is that they both 
undertake research and want to produce the “best” research outcomes.  
In particular, universities’ main aim is to expand their knowledge and to spread it among the 
society. In order to pursue their mission, they are engaged in research and licensing, which can be 
seen as the major form of technology transfer. Their research activities lead universities to get in 
contact with industry also through joint research projects or by performing sponsored research. 
Universities can also obtain government research funds by applying for public funding granted by 
the National Research Agency (NRA). In this case, universities set up a research project proposal 
and sent it to the NRA for evaluation. The NRA funding criteria are based on the research 
direction of the proposal (basic projects are favoured) and on the variance of the capabilities 
involved. Additional information on these criteria can be found in the appendix A.1.  
Large Diversified Firms (LDFs) are actors with a large capital stock and a broad specialization 
pattern (as the name suggests). LDFs’ aim is to produce as many new drugs as possible, filling up 
their pipeline. For this reason, besides own research, LDFs intensively screen the market for 
research, searching for new patents to acquire from other agents through licenses. LDFs also rely 
on sponsorships of university research as alternative source of patents. 
Finally, Dedicated Biotech Firms (DBFs) are private actors with a small capital stock compared to 
LDFs. DBFs are specialized in a small subset of capabilities and abilities, due to the narrowness of 
their financial resources. In order to survive in the long run, DBFs are forced to apply for venture 
capitalists’ funding. VCs will invest only in those companies who proved to have strong research 
skills, i.e. in those companies that hold a large cumulated number of patents. Their efforts to 
produce innovative outputs induce biotech companies to approach also universities, in order to get 
access to academic knowledge. Moreover DBFs are engaged in extensive licensing activities with 
LDFs, which provide large additional resources that are crucial for their survival.  
 
4.2 University-Industry Relationships 
 
Interactions among agents lead to the rise of University-Industry relationships. In particular 
universities interact with DBFs through joint research projects in which knowledge is mutually 
exchanged. Mixed teams of university and LDF researchers working on a joint research project are 
unlikely to be observed in reality (Poyago-Theotoky et al., 2002). Therefore, we designed the 
interaction between universities and LDFs in a twofold way as licensing or sponsoring relations. In 
both cases knowledge is transferred from universities to LDFs which reward universities through a 
corresponding transfer of financial resources. These relationships are depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The design of University-Industry Relationships in the model 
 
If a university research project eventually leads to a patent, the university tries to find a LDF 
partner in order to grant an exclusive license that increases the university capital stock through 
periodical royalties. Similarly, through sponsorships universities receive funding from LDFs to 
perform selected research projects. It is important to notice that the cumulated number of patents 
hold by a university plays a crucial role. The more patents a university holds the easier it is to access 
industry funding. Indeed, only the most productive universities in terms of patents are eligible for 
LDFs’ sponsorships. Furthermore, LDFs only sponsor applied research projects (i.e. projects 
whose research direction value (RD) is above a certain threshold – see paragraph 4.6 and appendix 
A.4). Consequently, universities which get a sponsorship shift the research orientation of the 
sponsored research project towards a more-applied direction. This is because UNIs know that it 
might be difficult to receive further funding in future if they do not prove to be able to produce a 
patentable outcome. 
In other words, both in the case of licensing and sponsorships, the patent can be considered as a 
powerful tool that is able to produce the so-called resource effect (Breschi et al. 2007). Basically, the 
patent is a signal of the academic researchers’ abilities.  A strong signal allows attracting more funds 
from industry as well as from the NRA (whose funding allocation criteria favour universities which 
are engaged in patenting4). The increased amount of financial resources allows the receiving 
university to undertake more research projects, increasing the probability of filing new patents and, 
by this, increasing university’s resources further on. 
 
 
 
                                                      
4 This is a common trend in many countries, as government funds allocation has been increasingly inspired by 
criteria of competition (Clark, 1998, Vincent-Lancrin 2004). 
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4.3 The model’s dynamics 
 
Figure 2 shows the model flowchart. We distinguish between stock inputs (light gray boxes), 
decisions (white boxes), actions (black boxes) and outcomes (dark grey boxes). Each simulation run 
consists of several iterations, i.e. cycles of research. A cycle starts with the agents’ decision on how 
to allocate their budget (that is the amount of their capital stock to finance the starting cycle of 
research). Agents have different options. Universities and DBFs can allocate their budget between 
own research projects and joint research projects5. LDFs can additionally invest part of their budget 
in sponsoring universities’ research projects, acquiring licenses and performing clinical trials. 
Afterwards, those agents which have decided to undertake a joint research project and/or a 
partnership, move to the process of partnership and/or sponsorship formation, the others directly 
jump to the following action: running the project. Projects last several periods, in other words 
agents are allowed to refine their project and run it again if the first attempt is not successful. If the 
project is successful a patent is granted (Outcome 1). If the patent is granted to an university or a 
DBF, the patent holder search for possible licensees among LDFs. If the license agreement 
formation (Decision 3) is successful a license is granted (Outcome 2) and the LDF has to pay the 
related royalties to the licensor. Alternatively, if the patent is originally granted to a LDF, the firm 
can directly perform clinical trials (Action 2) and try to develop a new drug (Outcome 3) to earn 
revenues from it. Eventually the actors re-invest the money that they have gained at the end of the 
research cycle (from the license’s royalties or the sales of the new drug) in new research projects 
and a new cycle begins.  
 
As Figure 2 shows, agents have to take decisions. In accomplishing this task they are helped by 
some decision rules which shows some elements of adaptive intelligence (i.e. agents learn from their 
past decisions). Since the way cooperation and interactions are built is key for the main hypotheses 
of the paper, we will focus in the following on the process of budget allocation (§4.4), partnership 
formation (§4.5) and sponsorship formation (§4.6).  
 
Besides decision rules agents also follow some rules of the game, which can be grouped based on 
the three outcomes of our model: how to get a patent (§4.9 and §4.10), how to get a license and 
how to get a drug. For the sake of simplicity we will only explain how patents are generated, as our 
hypotheses and experiments focus on this outcome. We leave the role of licenses and 
commercialization of drugs for future work, hence we do not provide further detail on this part of 
the model in this paper.  
                                                      
5 As mentioned in subsection 4.1, universities’ own and joint research projects with other universities can also 
get funded by the NRA. In this case universities do not have to use their capital stock to finance their 
research projects. 
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Finally it is crucial to notice that what drives the dynamics of our model is knowledge. Knowledge 
has a multiple role throughout all the cycle. It affects directly the process of partnership formation 
(through the characteristics of the knowledge base of the possible partners) and indirectly the 
sponsorship formation (through the number of cumulated patents). Furthermore the knowledge 
base of the project determines (except for random events) whether the project is successful or not. 
We provide details about the knowledge base of the agents in subsection 4.7, on how knowledge is 
upgraded through research in paragraph 4.8 and on the process of patent generation in subsections 
4.9 and 4.10. 
 
4.4 Budget allocation 
 
Agents have to decide (i) how much to invest each period and (ii) how to allocate their budget 
through the different activities. It is evident that no actor can invest his whole capital stock in only 
one period, so agents have to decide the amount of their periodic budget. This decision is initially set 
randomly within the range 10% - 30% of their capital stock. In the following periods the actors 
follow a process of adjustment of the size of their investment budget which is based on market 
feedbacks. If they are successful (i.e. between the top 20% of their sector ranking – UNIs, LDFs or 
DBFs –) they will maintain the same amount of investments in the next period, otherwise they will 
increase their periodic budget by 10%.  
 
Once a periodic budget has been set, actors have to choose how to allocate it through the different 
options. First of all, it has to be stated that the budget allocation must respect a constraint which 
refer to the maximum number of projects per period that an actor is able to sustain. This number 
depends on the size of the actor (we use the size of the capital stock as a proxy). The larger capital 
stock an actor has, the larger number of projects per period is able to undertake.  
 
The budget allocation process is slightly different between firms and universities. Concerning firms, 
initially the periodic budget is split among the different activities ( ‘own research’, ‘joint research’, 
‘sponsoring’, ‘licensing’ and ‘clinical trials’ for LDFs; ‘own research’ and ‘joint research’ alone for 
DBFs) through a random process. Then a particular market feedback mechanism is implemented. 
This mechanism follows the principles of satisfacing behaviour, rather than optimizing behaviour, as 
applied by Nelson and Winter (1982) in their evolutionary model of firms’ behaviour. Periodically 
each firm (both LDFs and DBFs) compares its allocation strategy with the average allocation of the 
most successful firms (top 15%) of its own sector in terms of annual profits (total annual earnings 
of new drugs + total annual royalties of the licensing activity – total annual research costs). If the 
firm is successful, i.e. it is within the top 15%, it does not change its allocation strategy. If the firm 
is not successful it will modify its strategy as follows. The activity, in which the spread with the 
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average allocation strategy of the most successful firms is highest, will get 10% more of the budget 
in the next period. The 10% increase will be financed by a corresponding 10% reduction of the 
budget allocated to the other activities. 
 
Universities apply a similar budget allocation process than firms except for two important 
differences. First, UNIs are only engaged (as DBFs) in own and joint research projects. Second, the 
budget allocation process does not really decide how much of the universities’ capital is invested in 
own research or in joint research. In fact, through the same comparative process with the most 
successful universities (in terms of patents hold), a certain university decides how many projects to 
undertake on their own and how many to undertake jointly with other actors; but this does not 
necessarily imply that the project will be financed with university’s own capital. In fact, universities 
first try to get their projects funded by the NRA, than through a LDF’s sponsorship and only if 
they are not successful with these two possibilities they will finance research projects with their own 
capital. 
 
4.5 Partnership formation 
 
When an agent decides to enter in a partnership with one or more other agents in order to 
undertake a joint research project, she applies a particular partnership strategy in order to select the 
‘right’ counterpart. Two partnership strategies exist: (1) a conservative strategy in which the actor looks 
for a similar partner according to his knowledge base; (2) a progressive strategy in which the actor looks 
for a dissimilar partner. The actors that choose the former aims to undertake an incremental 
research project, therefore they prefer less risk and a common understanding. In this case the 
variance between the knowledge bases of the partners is little, this increase the probability of 
success but on the other hand reduces the potential magnitude of the project outcome (see 
subsection 4.9). Instead actors that choose to follow a progressive strategy aim to undertake a 
radical research project. In this case the variance between the knowledge bases is high, with a 
positive effect on the potential innovativeness of the project outcome but with a negative effect on 
the probability of success. Hence, the decision rule in the model is grounded on the different aims 
of the agents and on a mechanism based on similarities and complementarities with respect to the 
agent’s knowledge base. This rule of selection is supported by recent literature on partner selection 
in innovation networks (Guezguez et al., 2009; Balconi et al., 2009). 
 
It is also important to add that, regardless of the partnership strategy, in all cases agents first look 
for partners among the list of agents with which they had a successful cooperation in the past. If 
there are no agents satisfying the requirements of the chosen partnership strategy then they extend 
the search to the other agents. This reflects the aim to increase the probability of success of the 
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partnership and is in line with well known evidences that accumulated network resources arising 
from firm participation in the network of prior alliances are influential in firms' decisions to enter 
into new alliances (Gulati, 1995, 1999). 
 
4.6 Sponsorship formation 
 
The sponsorship procedure is introduced in Table 1. The first step is the creation of two rankings. 
In the first one, LDFs are ranked according to their sponsorship budget. In the second one all 
UNIs who have projects that have not been sponsored by the NRA are ranked according to their 
cumulate number of patents. Then, a matching procedure starts. The first university of the ranking 
gets the sponsorship from the first LDF that has enough remaining sponsorship budget to finance 
the research project (all the UNIs’ research projects have equal cost, which is exogenously fixed).  
 
Table 1: The sponsorship mechanism 
 
Private 
agent 
Sponsorship 
budget 
Remaining 
sponsorship 
budget 
Who will 
the sponsor 
be? 
 Public 
Agent 
Cumulate 
patents 
Project 
cost 
LDF1 20 0 X  UNI1 10 5 
LDF2 15 0 X  UNI2 6 5 
LDF3 10 5 √ Å UNI3 3 5 
…     …   
LDFN 5 5   UNIM 0 5 
 
It is important to notice that the cumulate number of patents held by a university, as well as the size 
of LDFs’ sponsorship budget play a crucial role. The more patents a university holds the easier 
access to industry funding it has. This is one of the different ways in which the so-called resource 
effect is implemented in the model. Of course the biggest firms in terms of sponsorship budget are 
able to get in contact with the best universities (the high number of cumulate patents is an evidence 
of the research abilities of the agent). Another important aspect of the sponsorship is the size of 
LDFs’ sponsorship budget. If a LDF wants to increase the probability to sponsor a successful 
university it has to increase its sponsorship budget, on the other side, this would lead to a reduction 
of the budget sets apart for the other activities in which it is engaged. It is evident that this choice 
can be considered profitable by the LDFs only if the probability that the sponsored university will 
come out with a patent (whose intellectual property, under the sponsorship agreement, is held by 
the sponsor LDF) is high. For this reason LDFs sponsor applied research projects rather than basic 
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research projects. Furthermore, those universities that get a sponsorship will shift the research 
direction of part (2/3) of their innovation hypothesis’ quadruples, toward a more-applied direction 
during the running of the sponsored project. This is due to the fact that UNIs knows that it could 
be hard to get further sponsorships in the future if they do not prove to be able to produce a 
patentable outcome. 
 
4.7 The agent’s knowledge base 
 
The model’s representation of the agents’ knowledge builds on the concept of ‘kene’ developed by 
Gilbert (1997) and applied in previous simulations of knowledge dynamics in innovation networks 
(Gilbert et al., 2001 and 2007; Pyka et al., 2002, 2007 and 2009; Ahrweiler et al., 2004a and 2004b). 
In the model we used the notion of kene, the knowledge base of an agent, as it has been developed 
further by Pyka and Scholz (2008). In this version, kene elements also include the research 
orientation of the actors. Figure 3 shows the concept of kene graphically.  
 
Figure 3: The kene concept 
 
The knowledge base of each agent consists of a vector containing different ‘units of knowledge’ 
called quadruples. Each quadruple includes: a research direction (RD) which allows to differentiate 
between universities (mainly engaged in basic research) and firms (mainly engaged in applied 
research), a capability (C) which stands for the particular technological discipline in which actors are 
engaged (pharmaceutical or biotechnology), an ability (A) which reveals the actor’s specialization in 
his/her capability field and an experience level (E) which shows for how long an agent has been 
active in a certain ability. The research direction is represented by an integer. It can take values from 
0 (pure basic research) to 9 (pure applied research). In the model biotechnology covers the array of 
capabilities from 1 to 60, whereas the range from 61 to 100 stands for pharmaceutical capabilities. 
The range of abilities, instead, spans from 1 to 10. Finally, the experience level depends on the use 
of knowledge in research projects: if the knowledge is applied in a certain research project 
(individually or jointly with other actors) the experience level of the respective actor’s kenes 
increases by 1 each period; if the knowledge is not used the experience level reduces each period, if 
it reaches 0 the respective knowledge is forgotten. The initial distribution of the kene variables for 
the different agents is provided in the appendix (§A.5). 
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4.8 Learning and cooperation 
 
The actors choose whether to conduct research on their own, to collaborate with other actors or 
both, according to the budget allocation explained in subsection 4.4. As in Gilbert, Pyka and 
Ahrweiler (2001) (see also Gilbert et al., 2007; Pyka et al., 2002, 2007 and 2009; Ahrweiler et al., 
2004a and 2004b) the process of own and collaborative research process is based on the 
combination of selected elements of agent’s knowledge base which form so-called innovation 
hypothesis (IH).  
When agents choose to undertake research on their own they focus on some selected research interests 
which are designed as a subset of their kenes. Project innovation hypotheses are periodically 
derived from these research activities. Once the project is completed, the experience level of the 
abilities involved in the IH are increased by 1 while the experience level of those quadruples of the 
kenes that are not involved in the IH are reduced by 1. This represents learning by doing and 
forgetting. 
In the case of joint research the project knowledge base is a combination of parts of the knowledge 
bases of the involved agents. Some quadruples of the agents’ kenes are randomly recombined to 
form a project innovation hypothesis. If the project is successful, the actors with an absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990)6 above a critical threshold acquire the knowledge of the joint 
innovation hypothesis which has been contributed by the project partner(s) with a reduced 
experience level. 
 
4.9 Transforming knowledge inputs into project outcomes 
 
Whether a research project is successful or not and which outcome is eventually produced is 
decided by two equations which determine the ‘value of success’ and ‘probability of success’. The 
former decides on the type of potential outcomes, the latter decides if the outcome is actually 
generated or not. These two equations are different for own and joint research projects. 
Furthermore, joint research projects are evaluated in two different ways following the partnerships 
strategy that actors have applied. This way, we are able to consider different aims which drive the 
partnership. A detailed description of these formulas can be found in the appendix. 
Basically the ‘value of success’ and the ‘probability of success’ functions are based on four variables: 
(i) the knowledge distance among the IH’s quadruples, used as a measure of heterogeneity of the 
knowledge applied in the project; (ii) a ‘research direction factor’, which accounts for the IH’s 
quadruples average research direction, (iii) the experience of the actor(s) and (iv) a so-called ‘technical 
                                                      
6 As a proxy of the agents’ absorptive capacities we apply a measure of un-relatedness (i.e. the variance) of 
their knowledge base, which is calculated as the average distance between all own kene elements. 
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factor’ (only for own research projects), which take into consideration the quality of the physical 
capital available to the project runner. 
The ‘value of success’ is affected by the research orientation of the agents and by the heterogeneity 
of knowledge. A basic research direction increases the potential magnitude of the innovation. This 
is due to the fact that it is mandatory to deeply understand the causes and effects of a disease in 
order to discover a new molecular entity which produces a significant improvement in the 
treatment (as it will be explained in the next subsection, this is how we define the most innovative 
patents). Therefore such a result is more likely to be achieved by someone whose research focus is 
the study of the disease, i.e. by someone who is predominantly engaged in basic research. On the 
contrary, an applied research direction reduces the potential magnitude of the innovation. In fact, in 
this context, for an agent who is engaged only in applied research it is harder to generate an output 
with a very high innovative potential. As argued by Angell (2004), the discovery of a new 
application for an already known molecule, or minor modifications of an already existing drug are 
more likely outcomes. The ‘value of success’ also depends on the variance in the capabilities 
involved: the higher (the lower) the variance, the higher (the lower) the potential magnitude of the 
innovation. The underlying idea is that the potential novelty is higher if many different capabilities 
are involved and lower vice versa, as discussed by Noteboom et al. (2007) and Wuyts et al. (2005). 
The effects of the research orientation and of the heterogeneity of knowledge in terms of 
capabilities on the value of success are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The relation between the ‘value of success’ and the kene-related variables 
 
The ‘value of success’ function predicts which kind of innovations can be potentially generated. 
Whether this innovation is actually successfully generated or not, is decided by the ‘probability of 
success’ equation. This equation depends on the same variables as the ‘value of success’ but in an 
opposite way. A basic research direction decreases the possibilities for a project to be successful (i.e. 
to end up with a patent). The same holds for a high maximum distance between the kene elements 
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of  the project’s innovation hypothesis, which is used as a proxy for the heterogeneity of involved 
capabilities and abilities. This definition of the probability of success reflects two difficulties: Basic 
research is truly uncertain by definition, therefore an applied research direction provides a higher 
probability to end up with concrete results than a basic research one. The other obstacle on the 
road to success depends on the difficulties combining heterogeneous knowledge in a single project. 
This surely increases the novelty of a potential outcome but, at the same time, reduces the 
possibility to achieve the desired result7. Finally, the ‘probability of success’ is also influenced by the 
experience level of the actors which obviously positively affects the likelihood to generate a patent. 
The experience level does not affect the ‘value of success’ because the novelty value of a project 
can be high even if the participant(s) is(are) not expert. Indeed new comers are more keen to think 
out-of-the-box and overcome what the literature calls learning traps (Levinthal and March, 1993, see 
also Christensen, 1997) which are due to a certain rigidity of thinking coming from 
overembeddedness in a particular field and path dependency of the learning process. On the other 
hand experienced agents can also contribute much to the novelty of a project due to their larger 
endowment of knowledge. Hence the experience level has no direct impact on the value of success 
but rather a strong influence on the probability of success. 
The relation between the ‘probability of success’ and the kene-related variables ‘research direction’, 
‘knowledge distance’ and ‘experience’ are graphically depicted in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: The relation between the ‘probability of success’ and the kene-related variables 
 
4.10 Research outcomes 
 
In this work we focus on a single research outcome: patents. Although in the “real world” 
universities are obviously widely engaged in publishing, tracing the publication activities is beyond 
                                                      
7 Therefore the relation between the innovative output and the knowledge distance, which is jointly 
determined by the combination of the two equations for the ‘value of success’ and the ‘probability of 
success’, is shaped as an inverted U. This is in line with the recent literature on knowledge distances and 
innovation (Nooteboom, 1992, 1999; Nooteboom et al., 2007; Wuyts et al., 2005). 
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the scope of our model. However, patents are not a uniform category. Even if they are identical 
from a legal point of view, huge differences exist with respect to their economic value. In the case 
of drugs, the differences are related to the newness of the related molecule and to the effectiveness 
of the treatment. In the model we distinguish between three kinds of patents (from the most to the 
least innovative): (1) A-class patent, (2) B-class patent and (3) C-class patent. We define our three 
patent classes drawing on the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classification of the new 
drugs as introduced in Angell (2004). The FDA is the US federal agency which decides whether a 
new drug can be commercialized or not. Once the FDA receives the request for commercialization 
based on a certain patent, the agency classifies the potential drug (thus, implicitly, the related patent 
too) according to two criteria: (i) the newness of the molecular entity and (ii) the improvement in 
the treatment of the particular disease. The drug can be characterized by a molecular entity which is 
completely new (in this case the drug is assigned with a ‘1’) or already discovered in the past (in this 
case FDA assigns the drug with a ‘0’). Moreover the new drug can provide a significant 
improvement in the treatment (in this case FDA proceeds with a privileged analysis - ‘P’) or a 
similar treatment as an old drug (in this case the agency proceeds with a standard analysis – ‘S’). It is 
important to notice that the discovery of a new molecular entity does not necessarily imply that the 
related drug provides a significant improvement in the treatment. On the other hand, a molecular 
entity already discovered in the past could be successfully used to treat another disease. For these 
reasons we propose the following patent classification: 
‐ A-class patent: combination (1)-(P); 
‐ B-class patent: combinations (0)-(P) and (1)-(S); 
‐ C-class patent: combination (0)-(S). 
In our view only the combination (1)-(P) deserves to be labelled as a truly innovative patent (A 
class) because it is both new-to-the-world and meaningful for the final users. Combinations (0)-(P) and 
(1)-(S) can be considered having a semi-innovative value because they lack one of the two 
characteristics of truly innovative patents. Finally, combination (0)-(S) is surely the least innovative, 
since it is little more than an imitation (so-called me-too drugs and generics) of an already existing 
drug which, moreover, does not provide any significant improvement in the treatment. Table 2 
shows the ‘value of success’ thresholds which generate the different patents. The calibration of 
these values have been carried out relying on some empirical evidences on the classification of ‘real-
world’ production of drugs (see appendix A.6) combined with insights gained through a sensitive 
analysis. As it can be noticed from the table, a research project is not successful if it does not 
generate a value larger than 0.5. One can interpret this as a threshold below which a research 
project may produce publications or working papers (which we do not take into consideration in 
the model) without being able to generate any patentable outcome. 
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Table 2: ‘Value of success’ and patent classes 
0.5 ≤ v < 0.63 v = C
0.63 ≤ v < 0.71 v = B
0.71 ≤ v v = A
As explained in subsection 4.9, it is evident that the probability to generate A-class patents is not 
the same for all actors. Besides the luck element which deals with the random components of the 
equations (see appendix A.2 and A.3), necessary conditions in order to discover a new molecular 
entity which is also effective are: a fairly basic research orientation, a sufficiently high variance of 
the capabilities involved and a good level of experience. 
 
5. Results 
 
For testing the hypotheses introduced in section 2, we first develop a standard scenario. In the 
following steps we run different experiments with alternative scenarios for each hypothesis and 
compare the results with the standard scenario. 
 
5.1 UIRs’ effects on universities 
 
The first hypothesis postulates that university relationships with industry, which are reproduced in 
the model through joint research projects, sponsorships and licensing, cause a shift of university 
research orientation from basic to applied. To test this effect of UIRs, we compare the results in 
terms of university average RD (for both the kenes and the current research interests quadruples) 
from the standard scenario with those generated by a scenario whose population is composed solely 
by universities. Figure 6 shows the comparison of the UNIs’ RD mean values in the different 
scenarios. 
Figure 6: Scenario comparison 
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The t-test confirms the statistical significance of the differences in the mean values (p<0.001). 
Accordingly, the presence of university interactions with industry increases the university focus on 
applied research. In particular, the average research direction of the kene elements increases by 
8.93%, whereas the current research orientation increases by 7.12%. Additionally, the standard 
deviation for the mean values of the university research direction is higher in the standard scenario 
than in the ‘only UNIs’ one (0.09 vs. 0.008 for the kenes and 0.105 vs. 0.005 for the current 
research). This confirms that the interaction with industry increases the heterogeneity of 
universities’ knowledge bases and research interests. In section 4.9 we argued that this has a positive 
effect on the magnitude of the university research outcomes, though contrasted by an increase of 
the RD factor, but, on the other hand, also reduces the probability of success (this issue will be 
considered below).  
Furthermore, the differences in the evolution of the average research direction between the 
standard scenario and the ‘only UNIs’ scenario, shown in Figure 7, demonstrates that the average 
university RD is not only higher in the case of interaction with industry but also continuously 
increasing, whereas in the ‘only UNIs’ scenario the university research orientation stays almost 
constant. Therefore these findings fully confirm H2. 
Figure 7: Differences in the evolution of the average research direction between the 
standard scenario and the ‘only UNIs’ scenario 
   KENE                                                                CURRENT RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second hypothesis deals with the potential positive effects that interaction with industry 
generates for universities in terms of a larger access to cognitive (i.e. larger knowledge 
heterogeneity) and financial (i.e. larger capital stock) resources. In particular, the third hypothesis 
can be split in two parts. First, according to H2, joint research projects with DBFs are expected to 
increase the heterogeneity of universities’ knowledge base due to the underlying knowledge 
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exchange processes. A larger innovativeness of university research outputs is expected if the 
positive effect on the ‘value of success’ stemming from an increase in the variance of universities’ 
knowledge is stronger than the negative effects caused by the decrease of the RD factor (due to a 
shift to more-applied research, as proved by H1) and by a reduced probability of success. To test 
this first part of H2 related to the increase of university cognitive resources, we compare the 
standard scenario with the results of a scenario in which DBFs are excluded from the population. 
The second part of H2 claims that university patenting benefits from the availability of extra 
financial resources coming from LDFs’ research sponsorships and from license agreements. To test 
this sub-issue of H2, we compare the standard scenario with an alternative scenario in which LDFs 
are excluded from the population. 
The results from the comparisons between the standard and the ‘without DBFs’ scenarios are 
shown in Figure 8. The differences in the percentages of A-B-C classes between the two scenarios 
have proved to be statistically significant (p<0.005).  
Figure 8: Scenario comparison in terms of relative number of A-B-C patents 
 
The results suggest a rejection of the first part of H2. The ‘without DBFs’ scenario generates better 
results in terms of the percentage of university A and B-class patents compared to the standard 
scenario. Accordingly, university productivity in terms of truly innovative patents is negatively 
affected by extensive interactions with DBFs. Furthermore, the test of H2 has revealed another 
important aspect. As shown in Figure 9 joint research projects with DBFs reduce the total number 
of patents produced by universities for each class.  
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Figure 9: Scenario comparison concerning the total number of A-B-C patents 
 
 
 
This finding is coherent with the insights given by the tests of H1. As explained above, the 
knowledge exchange between UNIs and DBFs leads to an increase in the heterogeneity of the 
university knowledge base, due to a higher variance of university capabilities and abilities, but these 
positive effects on the ´value of success´ seem to be overcompensated by the negative effects given 
by the decrease of the research direction factor, the increase in the knowledge distance and the 
decrease in the experience level, which reduce the probability as well as the value of success (see 
section 4.9). 
The comparison between the evolution of the relative production of A-class patents in the two 
scenarios, which is shown in Figure 10, further confirms the rejection of the first sub-part of H3. 
 
Figure 10: The evolution of the relative production of A-class university patents in the two 
scenarios 
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The second sub-part of H3 is partially rejected as well. The differences in the relative number of A-
B-C university patents between the ‘without LDFs’ scenario and the standard scenario, have not 
proved to be statistically significant (p>0.005). Nevertheless, the difference in the total number of 
university patents generated by the two simulations has proved to be significant (p<0.05). In 
particular, as Figure 11 shows, the total number of A-B-C university patents is always higher in the 
standard scenario than in the ‘without LDFs’ one.  
Figure 11: Scenario comparison in terms of total number of A-B-C patents 
 
 
The exclusion of the possibility for universities to rely on sponsorships and on licensing revenues, 
reduces significantly the number of projects that universities are able to undertake, thus, generally 
reducing the number of patentable research outputs. Therefore, a financial resource effect seems to 
emerge, but this has a general influence on the number of university patents without specifically 
affecting the most innovative ones. On the one hand this is due to the fact that there is no direct 
knowledge exchange between universities and LDFs, hence the ‘value of success’ is not directly 
affected by this interaction. On the other hand, as we have explained in sub-section 4.6, 
sponsorships provide incentives to universities to shift their research direction, hence the relative 
number of A-class patents should decrease. Our results suggests that the former effect is stronger 
than the latter. In other words partnerships with LDFs increase universities’ capital stock, leaving 
their knowledge stock substantially unchanged. The larger availability of financial resources allows 
universities to increase the number of project that can be undertaken, thus, increasing the total 
number of patentable outcomes. 
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5.2 UIRs’ effect on industry 
 
The third hypothesis focuses on the industry side of the relationship. In particular a positive 
influence of UIRs on DBFs’ knowledge base and patent production is hypothesized. To test this 
hypothesis we compare the results coming from an alternative scenario in which universities were 
excluded from the population (thus, impeding interactions with DBFs) with the results of the 
standard scenario.  
The difference in the percentages is statistically significant (p<0.005). DBFs widely benefit from 
knowledge exchange with universities. The percentage of A and B-class patents generated by DBFs 
own research and in cooperation with other DBFs in the standard scenario is about 4.6% higher 
than in the ‘without UNIs’ scenario (see Figure 12). The same results hold for the total number of 
A and B-class patents (see Figure 13). These findings confirm H3 and show that interactions with 
universities in terms of two-way knowledge exchanges, sharply increase DBFs’ innovative potential.  
Figure 12: Scenario comparison in terms of
relative number of A-B-C patents 
 
Figure 13: Scenario comparison in terms of 
total number of A-B-C patents 
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Finally, Figure 14 shows the evolution of the relative production of A-class patents by DBFs in the 
two scenarios.  
Figure 14: The evolution of the relative production of A-class patents by DBFs in the two 
scenarios 
 
 
 
Until about period 15, the percentages of DBFs’ A-class patents are very similar. The first periods 
are usually considered as an initial adjustment time of the simulation in which actors increase their 
experience and build their network of collaborators. The following surge in A-class patents in the 
standard scenario is interpreted as a signal that once DBFs have developed an adequate experience 
in collaboration, interactions with university start to achieve their true potential on the industry 
side. In fact, DBFs, thanks to their high experience level, are able to apply the new kene elements, 
gained through joint research projects with universities and characterized by a basic research 
orientation, in their own innovation hypothesis in the most fruitful way. As the figure shows, after 
the adjustment time, the trend of DBFs’ A-class patents is constantly about two percentage points 
higher in the standard scenario than in the ‘without UNIs’ scenario. 
 
5.3 The government’s role and the impact of research funding policies 
 
The test of the first two hypotheses shows that UIRs negatively affect university research 
orientation. The fourth hypothesis theorizes that government funding policies more favorable to 
basic research (through a larger public funding budget) might be able to prevent this shift. We test 
this hypothesis by comparing the standard scenario with three alternative scenarios in which NRA’s 
funding policies were progressively shifted toward a larger basic research funding budget and a 
reduction of the RD threshold to be eligible for NRA’s funds (MAX_NRA_rd5/4/3). As no 
further changes are implemented in the alternative scenarios, the impact of relationships with 
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industry on universities’ research direction and patent production is exactly the same as in the 
standard scenario. The scenario comparison in terms of mean values of the average university 
research direction and of the relative number of A-B-C patents are shown in Figure 15 and 16, 
respectively. 
Figure 15: Scenario comparison in terms of 
average RD 
 
Figure 16: Scenario comparison in terms of 
relative number of A-B-C patents 
 
 
The differences between the RD (Figure 15) and patents variables (Figure 16) among the different 
scenarios, which have proved to be statistically significant (p<0.01), confirm H4. An increase in 
government basic research funding prevents the shift of university research orientation from basic 
to applied research. This also causes an increase in the relative number of A and B-class patents 
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which academic research is able to generate. It is important to notice that even a small reduction in 
the mean value of RD leads to a considerable increase in the percentage of A and B-class patents. 
Between the standard scenario and the most favorable scenario for basic research funds 
(MAX_NRA_rd3) the mean value of the average RD is reduced by 0.19 which nevertheless leads to 
an increase of about 3% in the relative number of A and B class patents.  
Figures 17 and 18 illustrate the comparison of the evolution of the average university RD for both 
kenes and current research among the alternative scenarios. 
 
Figure 17: Scenario comparison in terms of 
evolution of the average RD - kenes 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Scenario comparison in terms of 
evolution of the average RD – current research 
 
 
The figures visually support what the analysis of the mean values in Figure 15 suggests. An increase 
in the government research funding budget avoids a shift of universities towards more applied 
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research, thus, increasing the relative number of truly innovative patents. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is 
confirmed by the results. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The application of the Agent-based simulation methodology generates new insights on the complex 
phenomenon of University-Industry Relationships.  
 
First, our analysis confirms that relationships with industry influence the research orientation of 
universities (H1). In order to generate highly innovative therapeutic solutions, a strong 
understanding of scientific knowledge is necessary. Therefore universities have to keep a basic 
research direction, alongside with more applied oriented joint research projects with industry. The 
‘traditional’ division of scientific labor (universities engaged in basic research and industry devoted 
in applied research) should not be radically broken. Besides interacting with each other and building 
a mutual understanding, university and industry should still keep their own identities. Otherwise we 
may face an unpleasant slowdown in the growth of scientific knowledge and in the improvement of 
the treatments of known and less-known diseases, which can only be realized through the 
development of new innovative drugs, for which truly innovative patents are a crucial input.   
Second, our experiments reject the hypothesis of a positive influence of a cognitive resource effect 
on university innovative patents productivity and partially reduce the influence of the financial 
resource effect (H2). Nevertheless, knowledge exchange processes are still a crucial characteristic of 
UIRs. Intensive interactions between universities and DBFs do not produce an increase in 
universities’ innovative capabilities. Instead, they reduce the total number of patents coming from 
academic research. The reduction of the amount of university patents that is observed when 
universities interact with DBFs (H2) and consequently shift to applied research (H1), is due to the 
fact that when the average research orientation becomes more applied, there are fewer universities 
that are eligible for the allocation of NRA’s research funding, because the research projects of many 
universities do not match the agency’s requirements concerning the basic research orientation 
anymore. This leads to a reduction of patents stemming from NRA-funded projects which 
generates a vicious circle. A decrease in the amount of patents affects the reputation of universities 
in terms of their research productivity, decreasing the flow of industry funds generated by 
sponsorships, thus, further reducing the amount of university patents.  
Even if universities do not take advantage, from a cognitive point of view, of interactions with 
DBFs, this does not mean that the relevance of these partnerships for universities should be 
disregarded. Joint research projects between universities and biotech firms allow for an exchange of 
the successful innovation hypothesis’ quadruples. The newly acquired capabilities and abilities 
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expand university knowledge base, thereby increasing its heterogeneity, yet this is not sufficient to 
increase universities’ patent productivity. Universities also need to be able to effectively combine 
the new knowledge in their research projects. As Ahrweiler and colleagues (2009) explain, the 
relation between knowledge inputs and technology outputs is not linear. Different actors follow 
different scientific and technological trajectories and for universities, as for any other actor, there is 
no guaranteed success. For instance, many universities might not have the right skills to deal with 
applied research. As we show in section 4.9, the probability of success positively depends on the 
average experience level of the innovation hypothesis and negatively on the heterogeneity of the 
knowledge base. The capabilities and abilities which biotech firms transfer to universities when they 
work together, are related to an applied research orientation. On the one hand, this increases the 
heterogeneity of university knowledge base, augmenting the potential magnitude of the research 
outcomes. On the other hand universities are not experienced8 enough to successfully deal with 
these new capabilities. This dynamic is confirmed by the insights provided by the test of the second 
hypothesis, which shows that new knowledge acquired from interactions with DBFs is not 
effectively applied by universities.  
Our findings also show that when a complex phenomenon like UIRs involving heterogeneous 
actors is analyzed, one has to consider all of its multi-facetted aspects. Even if we found that the 
existence of a ‘resource effect’, generated by UIRs, is limited to financial resources and excludes 
cognitive resources, the importance of the knowledge transfer between university and industry is 
not reduced. Instead, our results show that UIRs cause a significant increase in the innovative 
potential of biotech firms. This is due to a threefold effect. First, interactions with universities 
expand DBFs’ knowledge bases, allowing biotech firms to absorb new kene elements focusing on 
fundamental research. Second, they also increase the variance in their capabilities and, third, they 
have a positive effect on DBFs’ networking experience. Therefore our results highlight the 
importance of UIRs concerning technology and knowledge flows. Moreover, from the society point 
of view it is not important who develops an innovative new drug, but whether this drug is 
developed or not. Our findings suggest that besides universities, new scientific knowledge 
(symbolized by A-class patents) is increasingly generated by biotech firms. The creation and 
diffusion of this knowledge could be seen as a sort of ‘second mission’ of biotech firms (the first one 
would be, obviously, achieving commercial success), which complements the so-called ‘third mission’ 
of universities, defined as the commercialization of academic knowledge (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 1997). We argue that biotech firms’ second mission cannot be accomplished without 
close interactions with universities, which, as a matter of fact, have characterized biotechnology 
                                                      
8 The low expertise level of the newly acquired capabilities reduces ‘ΦE’, the average agent’s experience 
related to the IH´s quadruples –see (4), (6) and (8) in the appendix A.2 and A.3−, thus decreasing the 
probability of success. 
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since its early days. Indeed, although our model has an explorative nature and not an history-
friendly one (see Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002 and Malerba et al., 1999),  its results in terms of 
UIRs’ effects on DBFs’ innovative potential seem to reproduce the historical development of 
biotechnology. In fact, during the first periods of the simulation made with the standard scenario, 
universities play the leading role in the production of new scientific knowledge (A-class patents). 
Then, after some periods of collaboration with universities, DBFs have expanded their knowledge 
base sufficiently, including also basic research interests, to be able to widely generate truly 
innovative science-based research outputs. This shows that what Gibbons and colleagues (1994) 
called ‘the Mode2’ of knowledge creation, namely a co-production of scientific knowledge between 
different agents, emerges from our simulation. 
Finally, the application of a systemic perspective on innovation in biotech and pharmaceuticals 
shows that the negative effects on universities can be mitigated by public policies in favor of basic 
research. Even if public and industry research funding are sometimes considered to substitute each 
other, in the biotech and pharmaceuticals they are complementary. David et al. (2000) argue that 
the rational for government support to (academic) research is “the correction of the market failures in the 
production of scientific and technological  knowledge, arising from the incomplete private appropriability problems 
identified by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962)” (David et al., 2000, p.501). Our results show that 
government basic research grants are crucially important to counterbalance the different aims and 
incentives provided by industry which further enlarge the market failure, especially in the long run. 
Accordingly, government research policies should be oriented to raise the public research funding 
budget with the aim to ensure that an adequate amount of fundamental research is undertaken by 
universities. This allows to contrast the harmful effects of UIRs and to further rely on the positive 
ones. 
These findings are in line with the results of econometric analysis (Jaffe, 1989; Adams, 1990; Acs et 
al., 1991; Toole, 1999a and 1999b) and historical case studies (Link and Scott, 1998; National 
Research Council, 1999; Angell, 2004), surveyed by David et al. (2000), which show that 
government funded R&D generates beneficial spillover effects and stimulates commercial 
innovations. More specifically, in our model government funding has a twofold role. First, they 
create and strengthen capabilities in the universities. These capabilities allow for the creation of new 
scientific knowledge which, in the long run, spreads in the system through interactions with other 
agents. Second, government grants increase the amount of innovative patents which circulate in the 
system. As a consequence, the ultimate number of innovative drugs is positively affected.  
A summary of our findings suggests that, if properly complemented by an increase in government 
basic research funds, UIRs in the biotech and pharmaceutical sector have a positive total effect, 
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from the society point of view, on the development of new innovative patentable outcomes. If not 
matched with applied research, basic research is not valuable for society. However, there is nothing 
left to be applied if basic research does not constantly generate new scientific discoveries. Therefore 
it is of essential importance that the different actors engaged in research cooperate to produce new 
scientific discoveries as well as new innovative drugs. Our results show that joint research projects 
with universities are an important source of knowledge for industry. Possibilities to prevent harmful 
effects of the interactions between universities and firms exist and are relatively easy to be 
implemented for governments.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Today innovation activities are undertaken in extremely complex systems which are characterized 
by heterogeneous actors, multi-dimensional interactions and multiple knowledge flows. The 
increasing complexity creates new challenges for scholars. In order to understand multifaceted 
phenomena as University-Industry relationships and to capture their global effect it is no longer 
possible to solely rely on traditional methods of analysis. As proved by the persistency of an open 
and intense debate on UIRs effects, these methods have failed in the goal to provide a largely 
accepted perspective, due to their often oversimplified and narrowly focused approach. Agent-
based modeling provides a broader perspective grounded on micro interactions among 
heterogeneous actors. This methodology explains the emergence of macro-dynamics in terms of 
micro relations, exchanges and connections among heterogeneous and bounded rational individuals 
and organizations, thus capturing, in a relatively simple manner, a larger part of real world 
complexity.  
The development of our agent-based model focused on knowledge dynamics underlying 
University-Industry Relationships. A bunch of simulation experiments provided new insights that 
contribute to the formation of a more widely accepted perspective on UIRs total effects on the 
short and long run production of innovative outputs in biotech and pharmaceutical sectors. Our 
results highlight the necessity to maintain a wide overview on UIRs effect, because an excessively 
narrow focus on some aspects might bias the perception of the total effects. Indeed, our results 
show that complex knowledge dynamics underlie UIRs. According to our simulation experiments 
relationships with industry modify the reward and incentive schemes for universities, as Stephan 
(1996) and Nelson (1959) argued. Consequently universities tend to shift their research orientation 
from basic to applied research. On the one hand, this affects industry positively (in particular 
DBFs’ research productivity) as firms are able to benefit from knowledge exchange with 
universities and increase their innovative capabilities. Thus, in the short run a welfare gain coming 
from an increase in the DBFs’ production of innovative drugs occurs. On the other hand, a 
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dangerous situation may arise in the long run. The smaller amount of basic research conducted by 
universities could ultimately lead to harmful effects to the research system and the society as a 
whole, under the shape of a slowdown of scientific and therapeutic progress. Our findings prove 
that governments’ policies more keen to support academic basic research provide a way out from 
this unpleasant situation. Accordingly, policy makers should not legitimize a reduction in public 
support to academic basic research as a consequence of an increase in industry funding to 
universities, as it frequently happens (e.g. see Blumenthal, 2003). Our results suggest that these two 
sources of university funding have different but complementary aims and address different needs. 
This strongly highlights the importance of a coordinated and harmonious innovation system as a 
platform which sustain innovation both in the short and long run. 
Although data on drugs production, R&D investments, university patenting and licensing revenues 
have been used as benchmark to get some orders of magnitudes in the calibration, our model is not 
specifically grounded on empirical evidences. Since our aim was not to develop an history-friendly 
model (see, for instance, Malerba et al., 1999) but rather a theoretical model applicable to the 
analysis of hypothetical scenarios, a detailed process of empirical validation would have been 
unnecessary and irrelevant, if not impossible given the complexity of the model (which counts 17  
parameters in the equations and 23 initial conditions, as listed in the appendix A.3, A.4 and A.5). 
Nevertheless, as our analysis focused on the comparison of several scenarios in terms of production 
of A, B and C-class patents, it is important that the standard scenario of our model is able to 
reproduce the stylized facts concerning the trends and the relative numbers of the three classes of 
innovative outcomes. As shown in the appendix A.6, the difference in the relative number of A, B 
and C patents in the model resembles those that we observe when looking at the distribution of A, 
B and C-class drugs in the real world. The trends also look similar, even though the real ones 
fluctuates much more than the artificial ones. This is unavoidable as random events have a stronger 
importance in reality. Therefore, the model is able to replicate the distribution of innovative 
outcomes that we observe in the biotech and pharmaceuticals innovation system. The comparative 
nature of our experiments, which was limited to the investigation of the effects of alternative 
scenarios on the generation of innovative outcomes, makes this relatively simple calibration strategy 
sufficient to provide reliable insights. 
Besides the calibration of the equation parameters and initial conditions, there are other possible 
aspects which can influence the results. These are: the assumptions made about the particular 
functional forms of the equations governing the production of patents and about the nature of the 
budget allocation process and the mechanisms of partnership and sponsoring formation. It is 
crucially important to notice that these assumptions were not expression of the particular tastes of 
the authors but solidly grounded on theories and empirical evidences which can be find in the 
35 
 
literature, as we have argued in different subsections of the paper. This is a fruitful area of 
complementarity between Agent-based models and ‘traditional’ research tools which have to be 
exploited more heavily in the future of the discipline.  
What has been left over from our analysis are the micro-processes whose aggregation lead to the 
emergence of macro phenomenon. Despite the micro-foundation of our model we preferred to 
focus on the aggregate variables, even though we can differentiate between the single agents whose 
interactions are responsible for the generation of the macro-based evidences. We chose so because 
we believe that this kind of analysis would have required a much larger amount of data to validate 
the results of the model at the micro-level. These data are not at our disposal. Furthermore several 
modifications to the principles of the model should be made to accomplish this task. However we 
are aware of the importance to look closely at the micro-macro interactions. Additional and 
extremely interesting results could be provided, for instance concerning the distinction and the 
characterization of successful and un-successful agents. Efforts to collect sufficient data to calibrate 
and validate future versions of the model at a micro-level will be done and such analysis will be 
performed in future researches. 
Finally there are other features of the model which have not been exploited in this work. For 
instance, the analysis of the functioning of the market of research in terms of  university licensing 
and its effect on the innovation system are also others interesting notes on the agenda for future 
researches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
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A.1 The National Research Agency (NRA) 
 
The behaviour of the National Research Agency in the model aims to reproduce, in a simplified 
version, the role played by the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), and by some smaller 
European national agencies, in the “real world”. The NIH is the larger life sciences research 
funding body in the world (Angell, 2004). Although the NIH also invests a minor part of its annual 
budget in research programs designed for the industry (Small Business Innovation Research and 
Small Business and Technology Transfer Programs), the larger part (more than 83%) of the NIH’s 
funding is granted to universities, medical schools and other research institutions, whereas about 
10% of NIH’s budget supports projects conducted in the Institute’s laboratories (NIH Grants 
Policy Statement9, 2003). In the model the NRA is purely a funding body which do not conduct 
research on its own. Furthermore we only allow NRA to finance universities; whereas LDFs and 
DBFs have others source of funding (production of new drugs and licensing).  
The allocation process of NRA’s funding is designed as follow. Universities can apply for funding 
both for own research projects and for joint research projects with other universities. If they want 
to undertake a joint research project, universities will start to look for partners according to their 
partnership strategies. Afterwards (or as a first step in case of own research project) a project 
proposal has to be set up. The project proposal is built up mixing part of the agents’ kenes that 
constitutes the project knowledge base. Then all the proposals are sent to the NRA. The agency has 
an exogenously fixed annual budget, which is divided in two parts. The largest one is designated to 
finance basic research projects (whose average research direction value is equal or less than an 
exogenously set threshold), and the smallest one is set aside for applied research projects. The 
former is bigger than the latter due to the specific aim of the NRA to support and provide 
incentives for basic research. Within the two budgets not all the proposals are accepted and 
financed. First the proposals are assigned to their respective budget category (either basic or 
applied) than they are ranked according to the number of different capabilities each proposal 
contains. In this way incremental and radical research projects can be distinguished. For every 
budget categories only a selected number of incremental and radical (basic or applied) research 
projects are financed. Figure A.1 illustrates on this process. 
 
 
                                                                                     
Figure A.1: NRA’s annual budget allocation 
                                                      
9 http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2003/nihgps_2003.pdf 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  NRA’s basic research budget allocation                                        NRA’s applied research budget allocation 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.2 ‘Value of success’ and ‘probability of success’ for own research projects 
 
The ‘value of success’ and ‘probability of success’ for own research projects depend on four 
knowledge variables: (i) the knowledge distance among the IH’s quadruples, used as a measure of 
the un-relatedness of the knowledge applied in the project; (ii) a ‘research direction factor’, which 
accounts for the IH’s quadruples average research direction, (iii) a so-called ‘technical factor’ and 
(iv) the experience of the actor. Before we introduce to the ‘value of success’, and ‘probability of 
success’ functions we briefly explain these four variables.  
 
The distance between two kene elements is calculated as follow: 
 
(1) 
 (1)
Where d is the distance and α and β are used to weight the single distances between the kene 
elements. The average of all the distances d between all kene elements can be interpreted as a 
measure of the un-relatedness of project’s knowledge, i.e. of the heterogeneity of project’s 
innovation hypothesis quadruples. 
frequency
X incremental applied 
research proposals that 
will be financed 
Y  radical applied
research proposals that 
will be financed 
variance in capabilites
frequency 
X incremental basic 
research proposals that 
will be financed 
Y  radical basic 
research proposals that 
will be financed 
variance in capabilites
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The research direction factor, to be included in the ‘value of success’ and in the ‘probability of 
success’ formulas is calculated as: 
 
(1)  
(2)
Where ‘avRD’ is the average research direction of the project’s kene elements. Figure A.2 
graphically shows the relationships between ‘avRD’ and ‘RDfac’. 
Figure A.2: The Research Direction factor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows that the higher the average research direction of a project is, the higher the RD 
factor becomes, which leads to a higher value of success (see (3) ).  
For an evaluation of own research projects we also account for a technological factor. When actors 
decide to go-it-alone, they can only rely on their own resources. Although some exceptions exist, in 
general universities have less valuable and sophisticated technical instruments and machineries than 
firms. Furthermore, they do not have the competences to improve the research devices on their 
own. Due to the higher amount of financial resources, LDFs have more powerful and accurate 
research instruments. Therefore we introduced a technological factor in the ‘value of success’ 
function for own research projects, in order to account for the differences in the technical 
equipment of actors. In particular, the relationship is as follow: the higher the technological factor, 
the higher the value of success. It has to be noticed that differences in the technical equipment no 
longer matter once actors decide to undertake research in cooperation with other agents. The 
technological factor (TF) for each agent class have been calibrated relying on a sensitive analysis 
and can be found in Table A.1.  
 
 
 
Table A.1: The technological factors 
Agents TF
avRD
RDfac 
0 
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UNIs 0.9
DBFs 1.1
LDFs 1.2
The effects of the knowledge distance, the research direction factor and the technological factor are 
combined together in the ‘value of success’ function for own research projects, which is introduced 
in (3): 
 
(1)  
(3)
‘TF’ is the technological factor, ‘mind’ is the minimum distance in the knowledge-space between the 
kene elements of the innovation hypothesis, ‘maxd’ is the maximum distance and ‘avd’ is the 
average distance among the kene elements of the actor’s current work10. RDfactor is the research 
direction factor. ‘τ1’and ‘ τ2’ standardize the output within the expected knowledge space depending 
on the research orientation. ‘a1’ and ‘a2’ weight the contribution of the knowledge distance and the 
research direction factors, with a1<a2. Finally, δ1 is a scaling factor and σ1 is a randomly distributed 
variable.  
Whether the potential outcome from the value of success formula is generated or not is decided by 
the ‘probability of success’ formula (4). The project is successful −i.e. the output from (3) is 
generated− if: 
 
(1)  
and   
(4)
On the left side of the first condition we find the weighted average experience of the contributed 
quadruples (∅E/a3). In order to have a successful project, the experience factor must be higher 
than the right side of the equation. On the right side we have , which is a Poisson-distributed 
random variable, which is a normal-distributed random variable, the knowledge distance factor, 
standardized with τ1 and weighted with δ2, and the standardized research direction factor. The 
second condition to be respected, , has been added in order to specify that some projects 
can be successful but nevertheless do not generate a patentable output (see § 4.7). 
 
A.3 ‘Value of success’ and ‘probability of success’ for joint research projects 
 
                                                      
10 For actor’s current work we mean the sum of all the innovation hypothesis applied in all the research 
project that the actor is simultaneously running in a certain period. 
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The process through which a joint research project innovation hypothesis is transformed into an 
outcome is equal to the own research projects and is based on the two functions ‘value of success’ 
and ‘probability of success’. Nevertheless there are significant modifications in these functions. 
Moreover, joint research projects are evaluated in two different ways according to the chosen 
partnerships strategies. Furthermore, another main difference is that the quadruples of the project 
innovation hypothesis come from different agents’ kenes. This means that there is a greater array of 
possibilities to improve the project’s IH if the project is not successful, because the new quadruples 
can come from different actors, i.e. the project knowledge base is larger. This is the main advantage 
of a joint research project compared to a research project in isolation, together with the opportunity 
to link complementary competences and research directions and to the expansion of actors’ 
knowledge base. If the project is successful, in fact, each participating actor will acquire the 
quadruples of the IH which have been contributed by the project partner(s) in his own kene. 
The functions for the ‘value of success’ and the ‘probability of success’, for both conservative and 
progressive strategy, are introduced in the following paragraphs. 
 
Conservative strategy 
In the case of conservative strategy the ‘value of success’ function has been designed as follows: 
(1) 
 
(5)
As usual, ,  and  are used to standardize the output within the knowledge space, a4, a5, a6 
and a7 weight the contributions of the different elements and  is a Poisson-distributed random 
variable. The variable ‘mind’ is the minimum distance between the innovation hypothesis kene 
elements of the joint research project, whereas ‘maxd’ is the maximum distance. Finally RDfac is as 
in (2). Compared to own research projects, here the interpretation and the importance of the 
minimum and the maximum distance is different, because the project involves many actors. The 
‘shortest’ distance is the distance between the two most related quadruples of two actors and can be 
interpreted as a proxy of the absorptive capacity. Instead, the ‘longest’ distance is the largest distance 
between two quadruples in the knowledge space of two actors and can be interpreted as a measure 
of the knowledge un-relatedness. As Pyka and Scholz (2008) argue, if two actors have very related 
knowledge in parts of their kenes, the shortest distance is small. Thus, the absorptive capacity is 
high and, accordingly, they should be able to communicate easily with each other. Consequently, 
the ‘value of success’ is likewise high. On the other hand, combining un-related knowledge (i.e. high 
‘longest’ distance) also increases the potential magnitude of the project output. If the agents select 
their partners following the conservative strategy, they try to minimize the knowledge distance 
between them, therefore we can assume that they consider absorptive capacity to be more 
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important than knowledge heterogeneity. Consequently in the ‘value of success’ functions for the 
conservative strategy the contribution of the ‘mind’ term is larger than that of ‘maxd’ (a4>a5)  
The ‘probability of success’ for the conservative strategy is as follows: 
 
(1)  
and   
(6)
The standardization factor ( ) and the random variables (  and  ) are the same as in (4). The 
most interesting difference with the research project in isolation is the presence of ‘∅net’, which 
stands for the average value of the networking experience of the cooperating agents. It is important 
to notice that this term is always larger than 1, therefore if agents decide to cooperate, they always 
have a higher probability of success than if they would have undertaken the same research project 
alone. In fact, the left side of the equation in (6) is always greater than in (3), ceteris paribus. 
Furthermore the right side of (6) is smaller than in (3) because in the ‘probability of success’ for the 
joint research project we do not account for the RD factor. In fact, we assume that, when it comes 
to collaborate with other agents, the knowledge distance between partners is much more important 
than the research direction to decide whether a project is successful or not (nevertheless the 
research direction is still crucial for the value of success). 
 
Progressive strategy 
The ‘value of success’ and ‘probability of success’ functions for the progressive strategy have been 
designed as follows: 
 
(1)  
(7)
(1) 
 
and   
(8)
Besides minor changes in the standardization factors, the most important difference between (5) 
and (6) is that the contribution of maxd is larger than that of mind (a8 > a7).  In fact, when agents 
apply a progressive strategy, they aim to collaborate with very dissimilar partners. Consequently, we 
assume that they consider un-relatedness of the knowledge (maxd) to be more important than 
absorptive capacity (mind). 
A.3 List of (exogeneous) parameters and standard scenario’s settings 
42 
 
Parameter Equation Meaning Range Standard scenario 
α Distance between kene 
elements (1) 
Weight the distances 
between the kene 
elements 
0-1 0.5 
β Distance between kene 
elements (1) 
Weight the distances 
between the kene 
elements 
0-1 0.5 
TF Value of success for own 
research project (3) 
Technological factor 0.5-1.5 UNIs=0.9; 
DBFs=1.1; 
LDFs=1.2 
a1 Value of success for own 
research project (3) 
Weight the contribution 
of the knowledge distance 
0-1 0.4 
a2 Value of success for own 
research project (3) 
Weight the contribution 
of the research direction 
0-1 0.6 
a3 Probability of success for 
own research project (4) 
Weight the contribution 
of the experience level 
0-1 0.25 
a4 Value of success for joint 
research project – 
conservative strategy (5) 
Weight the contribution 
of the minimum distance 
0-1 0.3 
a5 Value of success for joint 
research project – 
conservative strategy (5) 
Weight the contribution 
of the maximum distance 
0-1 0.2 
a6 Value of success for joint 
research project – 
conservative strategy (5) 
Weight the contribution 
of the research direction 
0-1 0.3 
a7 Value of success for joint 
research project – 
conservative strategy (5) 
Weight the contribution 
of the random variable 
0-1 0.2 
a8 Value of success for joint 
research project – 
progressive strategy (7) 
Weight the contribution 
of the minimum distance 
0-1 0.2 
a9 Value of success for joint Weight the contribution 0-1 0.3 
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research project – 
progressive strategy (7) 
of the maximum distance 
a10 Value of success for joint 
research project – 
progressive strategy (7) 
Weight the contribution 
of the research direction 
0-1 0.3 
a11 Value of success for joint 
research project – 
progressive strategy (7) 
Weight the contribution 
of the random variable 
0-1 0.2 
vA Value of success Threshold for A-class 
patents 
0-1 0.71 
vB Value of success Threshold for B-class 
patents 
0-1 0.63 
vC Value of success Threshold for C-class 
patents 
0-1 0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.4 List of initial conditions 
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Initial condition Parameter Standard scenario 
Population Number of UNIs 150 
 Number of DBFs 400 
 Number of LDFs 14 
NRA settings Research direction basic/applied 
threshold 
5 
 Number of incremental basic 
research project financed by the 
NRA per period 
3 
 Number of radical basic 
research project financed by the 
NRA per period 
3 
 Number of incremental applied 
research project financed by the 
NRA per period 
1 
 Number of radical applied 
research project financed by the 
NRA per period 
1 
Sponsorship 
settings 
University research direction 
required by LDF to sponsor 
≥ 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.5 Initial distribution of agent’s kene elements 
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Agents Kene 
quadruple’s 
element 
Distribution 
UNIs 
 
RD 70% of UNIs’ kene quadruples have a research direction 
randomly distributed within the range 1 and 3;  
30% of UNIs’ kene quadruples have a research direction 
randomly distributed within the range 2 and 7. 
 C 80% of UNIs’ kene quadruples are distributed around 3 to 5 
capabilities focal points, the rest is randomly spread. 
DBFs RD 10% of DBFs’ kene quadruples have a research direction 
randomly distributed within the range 1 and 4;  
80% of DBFs’ kene quadruples have a research direction 
randomly distributed within the range 3 and 6;  
10% of DBFs’ kene quadruples have a research direction 
randomly distributed within the range 5 and 9. 
 C 90% of DBFs’ kene quadruples are randomly distributed 
within the range of capabilities from 1 to 60; 80% of this 
90% is distributed around a +/- 5% range of the first 
capability; 
10% of DBFs’ kene quadruples are randomly distributed over 
the whole range of capabilities (1-100) 
LDFs RD 20% of LDFs’ kene quadruples have a research direction 
randomly distributed within the range 1 and 9;  
10% of LDFs’ kene quadruples have a research direction 
randomly distributed within the range 2 and 4;  
70% of LDFs’ kene quadruples have a research direction 
randomly distributed within the range 5 and 9. 
 C 60% of LDFs’ kene quadruples are distributed within the 
range of capabilities from 61 to 100 with focal points with 
group 3-5 kene elements; 
40%  are distributed over the whole range of capabilities (1-
100) with focal points with group 3-5 kene elements. 
 
 
 
 
 
A.6 Empirical validation of the results 
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Figure A.3: Classification of A/B/C drugs from the Food and Drugs Administration 
(Source: own elaboration of FDA’s data available at www.fda.gov) 
 
Figure A.4: Generation of A/B/C patents in the model’s standard scenario 
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